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sirable citizens conferred a more speculative but nevertheless
demonstrable benefit upon the public. 15 The same may be said
of the regulation of women's hours of employment.' 6 Compared
to these statutes, the benefit conferred upon the public generally by the fluoridation of water supplies seems remote and
conjectural to the writer. It also seems that the means employed
by the city to achieve its purpose in the instant case have a
somewhat broader sweep than the statutes involved in these
decisions. The remedy in the sterilization case was narrowly
tailored to fit only those persons who, upon proper medical
examination, had been found to contribute to the evil sought
to be eradicated. No other member of the public was sterilized.
Regulation of women's hours of work was similarly directed
at the source of the evil, women's contracts of employment, to
which employers were necessarily parties. In the field of compulsory vaccination, the entire public is subjected to vaccination, but every member of the public is a potential carrier of
disease. The fluoridation measure in the instant case, while
aimed at the prevention of dental caries in children, subjected
not only children to the treatment, but other members of the
public who in no way contributed to the evil. Nevertheless,
the Louisiana Supreme Court did not find the measure arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable. It is interesting to note that
the legislation in the instant case was not challenged specifically as an invasion of freedom of religion.
J. Bennett Johnston, Jr.

CONTRACTS-CoNSIDERATION-PRoMIssoRY

ESTOPPEL

Plaintiff employees of defendant bus company were covered
by a collective bargaining agreement providing for vacation pay
and sick leave with pay, and also by a company-sponsored retirement plan. Under these programs, sick leave and retirement
benefits accumulated from year to year. Defendant, in accordance
with its plan to sell its buses and other equipment, appeared
before the City Council of High Point, North Carolina, to obtain
approval of the sale. In the presence of plaintiffs' representatives,
defendant's attorney verbally promised' to pay plaintiffs an
15. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
16. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).

1. Defendant contended that no promise was made at all, but the court
assumed for purposes of the opinion that the promise was made.
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amount equal to the unused sick leave and retirement benefits
accrued to the date of sale, which the company was not bound
to pay. The trial court, in a summary judgment, denied recovery
of the amounts promised. On appeal, held, affirmed. Defendant's
promise was unenforceable. There was no consideration for the
promise, and the facts did not justify application of the doctrine
of promissory estoppel. Byerly v. Duke Power Co., 217 F.2d 803
(4th Cir. 1954).
The common law rule is that a promise, to be enforceable,
must be supported by consideration. 2 Consideration is an act, a
promise or a forbearance bargained for and given in exchange
for a promise.3 Courts often look to the immediate purpose or
motive of the promise to determine if the requirement of bargain
is satisfied.4 If a promise is made to induce action or forbearance, the promisor may be bound although the person to whom
the promise is made need not be.5 For example, employers'
promises of pensions,6 bonuses, 7 and death benefits8 made to
employees to induce their continued service, which have induced
that service, have been held enforceable because the elements of
2. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 19 (1932); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 349 (1950);
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 99 (rev. ed. 1938).
3. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 75 (1932).

1

4. Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379 (1903); Tilbert v.
Eagle Lock Co., 116 Conn. 357, 165 Atl. 205 (1933); Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass.
114, 60 N.E. 397 (1901); Mabley & Carew Co. v. Borden, 129 Ohio St. 375,
195 N.E. 697 (1935); Twohy v. Harris, 194 Va. 69, 72 S.E.2d 329 (1952); 1
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 452, § 130B (rev. ed. 1938). Motive, in the sense of the

object to be attained, can often be identified with consideration. 1 CORBIN,
CONTRACTS 364 (1950). Justice Holmes wrote that consideration must be the
"conventional motive or inducement of the promise." HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW 293 (1881). Corbin, a Reporter on the Contracts Restatement, believes
that its provisions amount to the same thing, for "if something is 'bargained
for' by the promisor, it is evidently his 'conventional motive or inducement.'"
I CORBIN, CONTRACTS 366 (1950).
5. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 152 (1950); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 141 (rev. ed.
1938).
6. Wallace v. North Ohio Traction and Light Co., 57 Ohio App. 203, 13
N.E.2d 139 (1937); Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 57 Ohio App. 4, 11
N.E.2d 878 (1937); Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Jones, 103 S.W.2d 1043 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1937); Schofield v. Zion's Co-op. Mercantile Institution, 85 Utah 281,
39 P.2d 342, 96 A.L.R. 1083 (1934).
7. Wellington v.

Con P.

Curran

Printing Co., 268 S.W. 396 (Mo. App.

1925); Roberts v. Mays Mills, 184 N.C. 406, 114 S.E. 530, 28 A.L.R. 338 (1922);
Hercules Powder v. Brookfield, 189 Va. 531, 53 S.E.2d 804 (1949); Scott v.
J. F. Duthie & Co., 125 Wash. 470, 216 Pac. 853, 28 A.L.R. 328 (1923); Long v.
Forbes, 58 Wyo. 533, 136 P.2d 242, 158 A.L.R. 224 (1943).
8. Robinson v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 180 So. 237 (La. App. 1938);
Tilbert v. Eagle Lock Co., 116 Conn. 357, 165 Atl. 205 (1933); Mabley & Carew
Co. v. Borden, 129 Ohio St. 375, 195 N.E. 697 (1935); McLemore v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 88 Ore. 228, 171 Pac. 390 (1918); Moore v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 202 S.C. 225, 24 S.E.2d 361 (1943).
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bargain and consideration were present." Such promises are
enforceable although the employees are free to leave the employment at any time and are otherwise paid for their services.
The employees' forbearance from exercising their privilege of
leaving the employment furnishes the consideration. 10 One exception to the rule requiring consideration" is the doctrine of
reliance on a promise, or promissory estoppel. Under this doctrine a gratuitous promise, otherwise unenforceable, is rendered
enforceable (1) if the promisee acts or forbears acting in a definite and substantial manner in reliance on the promise, and
2
(2) if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise.'
One court has held an employer's promise of a bonus enforceable
3
in most
because the promisee relied on it to his detriment;
14
found.
be
may
bargain
a
such situations, however,
In the instant case, plaintiffs contended that the employer's
promise was accepted as a settlement of their rights under the
collective bargaining agreement and that therefore the requirements of a bargain had been met. The court held that the
promise could not have been made in settlement of their rights,
because under the collective bargaining agreement plaintiffs had
no claim to the unused sick leave and retirement benefits which
were promised. It further stated that plaintiffs gave no promise,
act, or forbearance which could be construed as having been
given in exchange for defendant's promise, since their employee
status remained the same and they suffered no loss of wages or
other benefits owed them. One judge, dissenting, believed that
defendant made the promise to induce cooperation by plaintiffs
until consummation of the sale and would have found consideration in plaintiffs' continued service. 15 Plaintiffs also contended
that in absence of consideration the doctrine of promissory estoppel should be applied, alleging that they continued to work
for defendant and refrained from opposing the sale, in reliance
on the promise. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument, pointing
9. See 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 153 (1950); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 130B

(rev. ed. 1938).
10. Roberts v. May Mills, 184 N.C. 406, 114 S.E. 530, 28 A.L.R. 338 (1922);
Scott v. J. F. Duthie & Co., 125 Wash. 470, 216 Pac. 853, 28 A.L.R. 328 (1923);
Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 517, 137 N.W. 769, 44 L.R.A.(N.s.) 1214
(1912).
11. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 85 (1932).
12. Id.

§ 90. In nearly every case where the other requirements for the

doctrine are satisfied, justice will always require enforcement of the promise.
1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 657 (1950).
13. Kerbaugh v. Gray, 212 Fed. 716 (4th Cir. 1914).
14. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 680 (1950).
15. 217 F.2d 803, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1954).
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out, first, that the plaintiffs had been paid in full for their services; second, that they were not bound to continue in service, not
having promised to do so; and third, that no injustice would result from holding the promise unenforceable.
The question of whether consideration was present in the
instant case depends upon the purpose underlying the promise.
Defendant may have been bargaining for plaintiffs to forbear
opposing the sale, or the promise may have been made in a spirit
of liberality. If the promise was made to induce plaintiffs not
to strike or otherwise oppose the sale, their forbearance would
then be the consideration bargained for and given in exchange.
If the promise was made in a spirit of liberality, the fact that
the plaintiffs did not oppose the sale might indicate that the
substantial reliance necessary for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel was present. Whether the plaintiffs would have
so acted even if the promise had not been made is a speculation
on which the courts should not enter. 16 The fact that they were
paid for their services should not have rendered the promise unenforceable. 1'7 If the court refused to find substantial reliance
because plaintiffs were not bound to remain in defendant's
employ, it seems to have overlooked the fact that forbearance
from terminating one's employment could well constitute such
reliance. There is a possibility that plaintiffs did refrain from
striking to enforce their claim to the cumulated benefits, in
reliance on the promise. If they did, such forbearance would be
definite and substantial, and injustice would seem to have resulted from the court's refusal to enforce the promise. If, as
the court in the instant case assumed, the promise was actually
made, it is submitted that the case was incorrectly decided.' 8 As
noted by the dissent, the court might well have concluded that
the promise was made to induce forbearance on the part of the
plaintiff employees.' 9 If not, the court might still have applied
the theory of promissory estoppel as grounds for awarding plaintiff recovery of the promised benefits.
James F. Pierson, Jr.
16. Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114, 60 N.E. 397 (1901); DeCicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807, 1918E L.R.A. 1004 (1917).
17. See 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 153 (1950); 1 WILUISTON, CONTRACTS § 130B

(rev. ed. 1938).
18. See note 1 supra.

19. 217 F.2d 803, 809 (4th Cir. 1954).

